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SHOWING LOSS IN SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Pietro M deVolpi, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),' as amended, provides
remedial tools to private plaintiffs, the Department of Justice, and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commission).2 This article reviews the
Exchange Act's amorphous requirement that the SEC show loss to secure court-
issued civil penalties. 3  It recommends that courts follow the rationale which ex-
tended loss causation elements from the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (PSLRA)4 in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,5 to the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Guidelines and restitution calculations in United States v. Rutkoske.6
In Dura, the Supreme Court stiffened causality requirements for private plain-
tiffs alleging losses from securities fraud.7  The Court addressed a statutory issue
which resembles, in many respects, the calculations necessary to assess penalties
sought by the SEC in federal court for violations of Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule
1Ob-5.'
* J.D., 2008, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., International Affairs, with an
Economics Minor, 2005, The George Washington University. In the interest of full disclosure, the author notes
that he worked as a law clerk for Pepper Hamilton LLP on the SEC v. Snyder matter infra note 10.
1. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2. Single provisions permit civil actions by both the injured investor and the regulator. The statute also
empowers the Attorney General to level corporate fraudsters. See generally Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing
Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2001) (comparing civil and criminal claims under the Exchange Act).
3. See SEC v. Henke, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084-85 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (grappling with a 'paucity of
litigated open market securities cases"' in its decision to reject a requested $2.6 million penalty by the SEC follow-
ing investor losses totaling $24.5 million) (citation omitted), affd, 130 F. App'x 173 (9th Cir. 2005); George P.
Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for Federal
Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FiN. L. 1, 48 (2007) (observing that the equitable and legal grounds for issuing
civil penalties in the Seventh Circuit remain unexplored in the wake of SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656 (7th Cir.
2002)).
4. Pub. L. No.104-67, § 101(b), 109 Stat. 737, 743-49 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4
(2000)).
5. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities
Fraud Class Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 349 n.1 (2007) (defining open market transactions as those "where
investors trade securities with one another through the publicly traded securities market") (citing Steven A. Fish-
man, Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5 In Face-to-Face Transactions, 12 J. CORP. L. 251, 256-57 (1987)).
6. 506 F.3d 170, 178-79 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2488 (2008).
7. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). There are also instances where a violation of section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), and accompanying statutory penalty provisions under 15
U.S.C. § 77t(d)(2)(C), would be compatible with the findings of this article.
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Although the SEC has benefited from equivocal standards, 9 recent decisions
have pressured the SEC to adequately establish that a defendant's actions war-
ranted the penalty. 10 Parallels in statutory construction support applying Dura and
Rutkoske rationale to the Exchange Act's requirement that the SEC prove loss. 1
This article concludes that a uniform approach incorporating traditional forms of
statutory construction and practical application of law could serve as a manageable
alternative for defendants and the Commission. 12
Part I provides a cursory discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Dura,' 
3
and distinguishes loss causation in private actions from recent opinions extending
Dura to criminal penalties. 14 It then traces the development of SEC enforcement
powers over the past two-and-a-half decades, focusing on Congress's intent when it
authorized civil penalties against individuals and corporations.' 5 Part II harmoniz-
es this backdrop with current requirements for the SEC to establish a causal con-
nection in claims of misrepresentation to investors who traded in an efficient mar-
ket, known as "fraud-on-the-market."' ' 6  Based on trends in recent case law ad-
dressing SEC civil penalties, this article recommends that Dura and Rutkoske prin-
ciples apply where the SEC is required to make "a proper showing" that "such vi-
olation directly or indirectly resulted in substantial losses or created a significant
risk of substantial losses to other persons.'
17
9. See Roach, supra note 3, at 29-30 (explaining the rationale for courts granting broad requests for
remedies beyond traditional equitable principles as support for the agency's mission) (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971)) (quotation omitted).
10. See, e.g., SEC v. Smath, 277 F. Supp. 2d 186, 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (declaring "enough is enough" in
decision to award only $1 in nominal damages to the SEC following felony conviction in criminal proceedings,
rejecting requests for disgorgement and civil penalties); SEC v. Gann, No. 3:05-CV-0063-L, 2008 WL 857633, at
*12 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2008) (denying the SEC's request for a maximum third-tier penalty based on evidentiary
findings during trial, finding a lower penalty "adequate and consistent with the evidence adduced at trial and with
thepurpose ofthe statute"); SEC v. Snyder, No. H-03-04658, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81830, at *33-37 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 22, 2006) (denying SEC request for civil penalties based upon failure of the Commission to assert facts
satisfying discretionary factors utilized by district courts) (citing SEC v. Lybrand, 281 F. Supp. 2d 726, 730
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); cf SEC v. Slocum, Gordon & Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 144, 186 (D.R.I. 2004) (denying SEC's
request for maximum civil penalties where statutory burden not met under § 209(e) of the Investment Advisers Act
of Act of 1940). For a further discussion of the Lybrand factors, see infra note 117.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii) (2000).
12. See infra Part I1.
13. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
14. See infra Parts I.A.-I.B.
15. See infra Part I.C. (distinguishing statutory penalties created over the past twenty-five years).
16. Cf Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J. CORP. L. 829, 831-32
(2006) (distinguishing fraud-on-the-market claims from victim losses suffered following "face-to-face" purchases
or initial public offerings). See generally Sachs, supra note 2, at 1026 (comparing civil and criminal claims under
the Exchange Act). Fraud-on-the-market, in this context, refers to claims by the SEC that a misrepresentation
resulted in losses to investors who relied on that misinformation. See generally Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 241-242 (1988) (defining the fraud-on-the-market theory for application in private plaintiff actions) (citation
omitted).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A), (B)(iii)(bb). But see Michael J. Kauffiman, At a Loss: Congress, The Su-
preme Court and Causation under the Federal Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U.J.L. & Bus. 1, 42 (2005) (asserting Dura
"does not address SEC actions, which are not at all governed by the PSLRA").
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I. REACHING RUTKOSKE RESTITUTION
A. Loss Causation and the Dura Decision
Loss causation demonstrates that a defendant's unlawful misrepresentation or
omission caused market losses alleged by a party bringing suit.18 Upon enactment
of the PSLRA in 1995, Congress mandated that a private plaintiff must show loss
causation in order to initially proceed and therefrom succeed.' 9 One decade later,
Justice Breyer clarified the PSLRA standard to plead and prove loss causation in
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.2°
Dura exemplified a case of fraud-on-the-market. 21 A class of Dura Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc. stock purchasers filed suit in U.S. district court.22  These private
plaintiffs purchased stock between April 1997 and February 1998, when the price
of Dura stock hovered as high as $53 per share.23
1. Allegations by the Dura Plaintiff Class
The plaintiff class alleged that press releases originating from Dura during the
ten-month purchase period exaggerated the anticipated success for testing and de-
veloping a new form of asthma treatment.24 The plaintiffs further alleged that Dura
officials knew that those press releases contained false and misleading statements.25
Before the suit, Dura's performance suffered from two ailments: (1) The Food
and Drug Administration's (FDA) rejection of its experimental asthma spray; and
18. Ann Morales Olazabal, Analyst and Broker-Dealer Liability Under 10(b) for Biased Stock Recommen-
dations, I N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 1, 61-62 (2004); see also Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005)
(identifying elements of an action brought pursuant to the PSLRA, including "economic loss" and "loss causa-
tion," i.e., a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss" (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(4))).
Loss causation should not be confused with "transaction causation" (or "reliance") which private plaintiffs must
sometimes prove to show that their purchase was in reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission. See Dura,
544 U.S. at 341-42 (citing Basic, 485 U.S. 248-49); In re CMS Energy See. Litig., 403 F. Supp. 2d 625, 630 (E.D.
Mich. 2005) (rejecting argument that Dura increased pleading requirements for reliance). See generally Olazabal,
supra note 18, at 50-60 (explaining transaction causation).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) ("[T]he plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of
the defendant alleged to violate this title caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.").
20. 544 U.S. 336.
21. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 137, 147-154 (2006)
(observing that Dura represents the Supreme Court's first time applying the fraud-on-the-market theory since
Basic, 485 U.S. 224). Trial and appellate briefs filed by the SEC have also relied upon Dura to analogize the
causal connection between a defendant's actions, inflated purchase prices, and alleged harm to investors. See
Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Respondent at 57, Rockies Fund, Inc. v. SEC, 428 F.3d 1088
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1255), 2005 WL 1387142 (citation omitted); SEC's Response to Court's March 23, 2006
Order Requesting Additional Briefing from SEC, to the SEC's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Jordan's
Estate at 7-8 & n.7, SEC v. Pietrzak, No. 1:03CV01507, 2006 WL 1793576 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 26, 2006), 2006 WL
1679740 (citation omitted).
22. In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Secs. Litig., No. Civ. 99CV0151-L, 2001 WL 35925887 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2,
2001), rev'd sub noma. Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 336
(2005) [hereinafter In re Dura].
23. See Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933,936 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
24. The device, Albuterol Spiros, delivered medication to asthma patients without requiring simultaneous
inhalation. Dura, 339 F.3d at 936 n.2.
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(2) Less than expected sales projections for one of its leading antibiotic lines.26
Shortly thereafter, Dura management revealed that a decline in sales of a leading
antibiotic would decrease the company's anticipated revenues and earnings per
share (EPS).27 Dura shares plummeted in value from above $39 to below $21 over
the next three days.28 This led the company to admit to investment analysts that it
knew five months earlier that inventory and distribution issues would hamper an-
ticipated sales for the antibiotic. 29 Dura then disclosed the FDA's rejection of its
asthma spray for technical and safety reasons.3°
2. Deficiencies in the Dura Complaint and Loss Causation Analysis
Absent from the Dura complaint were allegations that a corrective disclosure
preceded a change in the price of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. stock.31 Instead, the
complaint merely alleged that members of the class paid an "artificially inflated
purchase price.",32 The Supreme Court ruled that private plaintiffs must adequately
plead and prove the causal connection between damages suffered and the defen-
dant's fraudulent misrepresentation.33 The Court distinguished the standard for
proving a defendant's act triggered economic loss from a lesser standard which
merely required plaintiffs establish that a defendant's violation preceded change in
a stock's price.34 Below, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had re-
quired only that a plaintiff plead "that 'the price' of the security 'on the date of
purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation.' 35 The Supreme Court
rejected this formula, finding that the degree of causal connection was inadequate
to meet the burden of proof proscribed for under the PSLRA.36
In conducting its analysis, the Dura Court worked backwards. Before analyz-
ing the pleadings standards for loss causation under the PSLRA, the Court eva-
luated the elements required to show causal lOSS. 37 In Part 1I-A of its opinion, the
Court evaluated the common law heritage for damage assessments, 38 and the ex-
26. Dura, 339 F.3d at 939.
27. See id. at 936 (discussing the decrease in anticipated revenues and EPS for the antibiotic Ceclor CD).
The plaintiffs also originally alleged that decreased sales of the respiratory sprays Nasarel and Nasalide contri-
buted to the decline. In re Dura, supra note 22, at *2.
28. Dura, 339 F.3d at 935-36.
29. Id. at 936 (indicating Dura management knew as far back as December 1997).
30. Id.
31. Seeid. at938&n.4.
32. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346-47 (2005).
33. Id. at 347 (requiring plaintiff plead and prove "what the relevant economic loss might be or of what the
causal connection might be between [plaintiff's] loss and the [defendant's] misrepresentation").
34. Id. at 343 (distinguishing "loss causation" from that which merely "'touches upon' a later economic
loss").
35. Id. at 338 (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 343 ("To 'touch upon' a loss is not to cause a loss, and it is the latter that the law requires." (cit-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4))); see also Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Dura, 544 U.S. at 343) (same), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1876 (2007).
37. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342-46.
38. See id. at 343-45.
Vol. 12
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press intent of Congress to permit recovery only where the plaintiff first showed
economic loss and proximate causation.39
The Court observed that the price of stock at the time of sale often reflects the
impact of extrinsic factors-and not merely the defendant's fraudulent act.4° Ac-
cording to the Court, attributing a change in price due to external market forces
gains even further credence as time passes. In other words, if too much time
passes between the disclosure of corrective information and sale of the stock, an
offender cannot (and should not) be punished for all investor losses.
B. Sending Dura to the Criminal World and Back
1. Stretching Dura Beyond the PSLRA
At first, courts limited application of Dura loss causation principles to private
claims alleging fraud-on-the-market.42 But within a year, courts began expanding
Dura causation requirements beyond PSLRA claims.43 Damage calculations for
common law fraud claims became a prime target for litigators and commentators
after Dura.44 A Florida court of appeals utilized Dura to justify, in part, its deci-
sion to overturn a $1.58 billion verdict against Morgan Stanley.45 Likewise, the
Fourth Circuit relied on Dura to determine damages for common law fraud under
Virginia law in Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc.
46
39. Id. at 345-46 (construing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)).
40. See id. at 343 (describing extrinsic factors including "changed economic circumstances, changed inves-
tor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions or other events, which taken separately or
together account for some or all of that lower [or higher] price").
41. Id.
42. See generally Schuster v. Andersen, 413 F. Supp. 2d 983, 1014 (N.D. Iowa 2005) ("Dura provides
little, if any guidance, with respect to what a complaint outside of a fraud-on-the-market case must contain.")
(citing Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 944 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)).
43. See infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
44. See Brandon F. White, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo: Supreme Court Case Calls Massachu-
setts Loss Causation Rule Into Question, BOSTON B.J., Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 18 passim; cases cited infra notes 45-
46.
45. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc., 955 So.2d 1124, 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-43 (2005)); see also id. ("[R]ecovering in a
securities case 'require[s] elimination of that portion of the price decline that is the result of forces unrelated to the
wrong."' (quoting Miller v. Asensio & Co., 364 F.3d 223, 232 (4th Cir. 2004 )). The Dura citation in Morgan
Stanley applied to its analysis of compensatory damages, which accounted for $604 million of the $1.58 billion
verdict overturned by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Id. at 1126.
46. Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005)), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1876 (2007). The court of appeals rejected arguments that
Dura was too narrow to apply beyond PSLRA claims. See id("[N]othing in the Dura Court's analysis of the
common law loss causation requirements... justifies a different standard for plaintiffs' common law fraud claim
under Virginia law."). But see Grand v. Nacchio, 147 P.3d 763, 774-75 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting the asser-
tion that Dura provided a single formulaic approach to calculate loss causation); cf Merill Lynch & Co., Inc. v.
Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171, 181-83 (2d Cir. 2007) (refusing to apply Dura loss causation requirements
to a fixed instrument distinct from securities). In Glaser, the Fourth Circuit ultimately relied on the Supreme
Court's analogy to common law torts to rationalize its application. 464 F.3d at 478 (citing Dura, 544 U.S. at 341).
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2. Causation and Loss Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
Following Dura, defendants prosecuted in criminal proceedings for willing and
knowing violations of the Exchange Act 47 began to challenge their sentences by
arguing that the Court's analysis warranted application to calculations for pecu-
niary gain and loss under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Sentencing
Guidelines).48
In United States v. Otis, a Fifth Circuit panel emphasized "the importance of
thorough analyses grounded in economic reality" in its decision to apply Dura
principles. 49 This reading grew out of other decisions under the Sentencing Guide-
lines before Dura.50 Therefore, the panel opted to apply Dura when defining
"loss" under Sentencing Guidelines section 2B1.1. 51 Criticizing the district court's
failure to "take into account the impact of extrinsic factors on [the company's]
stock price decline," the panel required lower courts to "take [] seriously the re-
quirement to correlate the defendant's sentence with the actual loss caused in the
marketplace, exclusive of other sources of stock price decline. ,
52
Although Otis addressed criminal sentencing, district courts in the Fifth Circuit
found guidance in the opinion for determining damages in matters litigated under
47. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2000) (authorizing criminal sanctions for willful and knowing viola-
tions).
48. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B 1.1 (2006) (fraud); id. § 2B1.4 (insider trading). The
weight of the Sentencing Guidelines shifted dramatically following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265
(2005). Today, "district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take
them into account when sentencing." Id. at 264 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)-(5) (Supp. IV 2004)).
49. 429 F.3d 540, 547 (5th Cit. 2005).
50. See United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d at 547 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Snyder, 291 F.3d
1291 (11 th Cir. 2002)) (identifying necessity to consider "numerous extrinsic market influences as well as the
soundness of other business decisions by the company"); see also infra note 61 (identifying authorities in accord
with United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 547 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1232
(C.D. Cal. 2002)). Snyder, a pre-Dura opinion penned by The Honorable Judge Donald P. Lay, rejected using
intended gain by a defendant where victim losses were reasonably calculable. See United States v. Snyder, 291
F.3d 1291, 1295 (1lth Cir. 2002) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 cmt. n.9, and United
States v. Orton, 73 F.3d 331,334 (1 th Cir.1996)).
Incidentally, Judge Lay (with Judges Bye and Bright) cited Olis as grounds for rehearing the Eighth
Circuit's tangentially-related United States v. Mooney opinion. 425 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 2005) (en bane) (Lay,
Bright and Bye, JJ., dissenting). Judge Lay also joined in the dissent in the original en banc opinion. See generally
United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1104 (8th Cir. 2005) (en bane) (Bright, J., dissenting), reh "g and reh "g
en bane denied, 425 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 2005).
But Mooney was an insider trading case addressing "gain resulting from the offense" under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines. See Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1099 (construing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.4 &
cmt. background (2002)); id. at 1100 n.6 (rejecting Dura); see also David H. Angeli & Per A. Ramfjord, Reex-
amining "Loss" and "Gain " in the Wake of Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo - New Ammunition for Securities
Fraud Defendants, CHAMPION, May 2006, at 10 (praising Olis and the Mooney dissent).
while Mooney received some harsh critiques, see Angeli & Ramfiord, supra, at 10 (criticizing the
rationale of Mooney), the opinion does appropriately acknowledged that the Sentencing Guidelines serve as an
initial benchmark before determining an appropriate sentence, see United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1101 (en
bane) (emphasizing that the Sentencing Guidelines only "start[ed] the sentencing process ... before considering
other statutory factors.") (citing United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 767 (2005)). The Eighth Circuit rationa-
lized a consistent sentencing scheme for condemning white collar criminals. See id. And the decision appears in
accord with a recent order issued by a Second Circuit panel in United States v. Zafar, No. 07-4345-cr, 2008 WL
4138219, at *3 (2d Cir. Sept. 4, 2008).
51. 429 F.3d at 540 (construing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 (2001)).
52. See id. at 547-49.
6
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the PSLRA.5 3 And the Second Circuit imported Olis into its criminal sentencing
proceedings in United States v. Ebbers.54  In Ebbers, the Second Circuit empha-
sized that the Department of Justice must prove during sentencing that a defen-
dant's fraud caused the alleged loss.55 The underlying rationale appeared to be the
court's recognition that considering market fluctuations is a contentious but neces-
sary matter when assessing loss caused by a defendant.
5 6
Following Ebbers, the Second Circuit explicitly recognized the "useful guid-
ance" of Dura in United States v. Rutkoske.57 The case evolved from alleged chop
shop tactics and shady dealings at a brokerage firm.58 After a trial by jury, the
court applied Dura calculations during sentencing to the amount of loss caused by
fraud for purposes of calculating a prison term under the Sentencing Guidelines, as
well as monetary restitution.59 Rutkoske found further support in the Ninth Cir-
cuit's opinion United States v. Zolp,6° which highlighted the impact of extrinsic
market factors.
61
The Second Circuit also went one step further in Rutkoske when the court ap-
plied Dura to restitution orders.62  In criminal actions, restitution measures are
based upon the loss "actually caused" by the defendant's violation.63 In reaching
this conclusion, the court provided only a glimpse of Dura loss application.
64
53. E.g., Romero v. US Unwired, Inc., No. 04-2312 C/W 04-2436, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60589, at *30
(E.D. La. Aug. 11, 2006) (citing Olis, 429 F.3d at 546); In re Sourcecorp Sec. Litig., No. 3:04-CV-2351-N, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41381, at *22-23 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2006) (citing Olis, 429 F.3d at 546).
54. 458 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Olis, 429 F.3d at 547), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1483 (2007).
55. Id. (citing Olis, 429 F.3d at 547). The Ebbers panel did not cite Dura directly.
56. The Second Circuit originally clamored "[w]orse, there is another variable" when describing the re-
quirements for determining loss in Ebbers, 458 F.3d at 128. But in United States v. Rutkoske, the court rationalized
this additional burden given its use in private civil actions. 506 F.3d 170 at 179 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 2488 (2008). ("[C]onsiderations relevant to loss causation in a civil fraud case should ... apply, at least as
strongly, to a sentencing regime in which the amount of loss caused by a fraud is a critical determinant of the
length of a defendant's sentence.").
57. 506 F.3d at 178-79.
58. See Mark Hamblett, Factors Other than Fraud Must be Mulled in Penalty, 238 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Oct. 29,
2007).
59. 506 F.3d at 180-81.
60. 479 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2007).
61. Id. at 719 (comparing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005)). The Ninth Circuit
also cited to the Bakhit opinion to support this proposition, see Zolp, 479 F.3d at 719 (citing United States v.
Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (C.D. Cal. 2002)), one of the opinions which the Fifth Circuit identified to support
its original loss causation ruling, see United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 547 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Bakhit, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 1232).
62. 506 F.3d 170.
63. United States v. Rothwell, 387 F.3d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 2004) ("An award of restitution must be based
on the amount of loss actually caused by the defendant's conduct." (quoting United States v. Liss, 265 F.3d 1220,
1231 (11 th Cir. 2001))); see also United States v. United Sec. Sav. Bank, 394 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2004) ("A
criminal restitution order is penal, not compensatory." (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1986))).
But as one commentator "put it bluntly, American lawyers today (judges and law professors included) do not
know what restitution is." Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1995). There-
fore, I will limit my analysis to pointing out that criminal restitution is not the same as the equitable remedy of
restitution sometimes utilized in civil actions. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § I cmt. h (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2000).
64. Compare the Second Circuit's recent holding that when determining whether loss calculations for the
price of securities are "legally acceptable" per Rutkoske, error occurred when the court below assumed that the
price of a purchase stock was zero for calculating losses. United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2008)
7
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C. Distinguishing a Quarter-Century of SEC Penalties
The PSLRA requires that private plaintiffs plead and prove loss causation. 65
But just as there is no requirement in criminal securities fraud actions to prove in-
vestor losses to secure a conviction,66 there is no requirement that the SEC plead or
prove investor losses in order to show that a defendant violated the Exchange
Act. 67 As one court pointedly put it, the Commission "does not stand in the shoes
of the purchasers and sellers who it asserts were defrauded.
68
1. Equitable Remedies in Federal Court
Following trial, proceedings in an SEC enforcement action are bifurcated and
are heard before a judge in a manner analogous to a criminal sentencing hearing. 69
Under the exercise of equitable powers, federal district courts wield "broad discre-
tion" to formulate remedies, i.e., disgorgement, in civil enforcement actions.7 °
Even though broad discretion exists for formulating disgorgement calculations,
some degree of causal connection is required before calculating ill-gotten profits
(citing United States v. Sash, 396 F.3d 515, 522-23 (2d Cir. 2005)) (finding error in failure to "deduct[] from the
purchase price the actual value of the instruments").
65. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345-46 (2005) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)).
66. United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 551 (3d Cir. 1998) (declining to require that federal prosecutors
prove "transaction causation," also known as "reliance"); United States v. Brown, No. 04 CR 159, 2006 WL
898043, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2006) (rejecting the argument that Dura requires federal prosecutors "prove a
causal connection between the fraudulent conduct and the victims' economic loss"), reh "g denied sub noma. United
States v. Goldenberg, No. 04-CR-159, 2006 WL 1229152 (E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2006).
67. SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd. 195 F.
Supp. 2d 475, 490-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); SEC v. Pace, 173 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Graham v.
SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1001 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 2000))).
68. See SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 450 F. Supp. 908, 916 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (distinguishing disgorgement calcu-
lations that require a defendant to surrender ill-gotten gains).
69. See, e.g., SEC v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11 th Cir. 2005) (holding due process requires a separate
remedies hearing unless "all essential evidence was already of record, and it did not present one of the 'limited
circumstances' under which the district court could properly exercise its discretion not to hold a hearing"); SEC v.
Solow, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1366-67 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (indicating separate proceeding held to determine liability
and appropriate remedies); see also SEC v. Montana, 464 F. Supp. 2d 772, 787 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (citing SEC v.
Church Extension of the Church of God, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048 (S.D. Ind. 2005)) (postponing award of
civil penalties until separate hearing held and evidence presented following award of summary judgment to SEC).
70. See, e.g., SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); SEC v.
First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1474-75 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing SEC v. Lorin, 76 F.3d 458, 4461-62 (2d Cir.
1996) (per curiam)); In re Smith, 365 BR. 770, 793-94 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007) (citations omitted). As explained
by the Ninth Circuit in First Pacific Bancorp, "[d]isgorgement is designed to deprive a wrongdoer of unjust
enrichment, and to deter others from violating securities laws by making violations unprofitable." 142 F.3d at
1191.
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from insider trading.71 This requirement is far from stringent given its purpose to
merely displace a defendant's earnings from a former wrong.
72
2. Civil Penalties as a Legal Remedy under ITSA, ITSFEA, and Remedies Act
Amendments to the Exchange Act
Few opinions directly address the nature of civil penalties available to the SEC.
SEC v. Lipson,73 penned by Judge Richard Posner, evaluated and recognized the
effectiveness of civil monetary penalties. Judge Posner referred to the statutory
remedy as a "heavy punishment" that, when applied to a defendant, could "bring
him to his senses., 74  More to the point, Lipson chastised a previous statement by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which presumed civil penalties
were a form of equitable relief. 75 Judge Posner explained that civil penalties were
in fact a legal remedy.76
Lipson is in accord with other authorities which hold that civil penalties are a
legal breed of remedial tools. 77 In 1984, the Commission sought "civil penalties of
relatively small amounts ... to mitigate the potential harshness of license revoca-
tion or suspensions., 78 Congress first responded by authorizing the Commission to
pursue monetary sanctions against insider traders via the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984 (ITSA). 79  Other remedial measures were included in subsequent
71. Compare, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231-32 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (requiring a
causal connection to distinguish legally obtained gains, but rationalizing a "reasonable approximation" due to
difficulty calculating gains), with SEC v. Maxxon, Inc., 465 F.3d 1174, 1179 (10th Cir. 2006) (advocating a rea-
sonable "end-date determination.., so that the defendant is not required to disgorge profits not 'causally con-
nected to the violation'), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2116 (2007), and SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 53-55 (1st
Cir. 1983) (en bane) (requiring calculation based upon change in value of stock held a reasonable time after reveal-
ing non-public information). The MacDonald standard was utilized in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 cmt. h, illus. 36 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
72. See SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 1998) (asserting that "broad equity
powers" guide disgorgement calculations) (citations omitted); see also SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc.,
574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1977) (permitting the SEC to calculate disgorgement through an analysis "not free of
inaccuracy, [but] reasonably complete and suitable"). But cf. Roach, supra note 3, at 48 (explaining that dis-
gorgement can be "either a remedy at law or equity").
73. SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2002).
74. See id. at 664 (affirming decision to apply maximum penalty for insider trading under the ITSA, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-1, where "evidence against [defendant] was overwhelming, and his insistence in the fact of it that he
is a shorn sheep argues for a heavy punishment to bring him to his senses").
75. SECv. Lipson, 278 F.3d at 662 (criticizing SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1990)).
76. See id. (explaining that Clark "assumed, but without discussion, and we think erroneously, that civil
penalties in SEC cases are not a form of legal relief."); see also SEC v. Solow, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1367 (S.D.
Fla. 2008) (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,422 (1987), and Lipson, 278 F.3d at 662).
77. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 424 (distinguishing the nature of disgorgement from civil penalties); Roach, supra
note 3, at 19 & n.59 (citations omitted); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), Pub. L. 73-291,48 Stat.
881, 903 (codified with some differences in language at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000)) ("The rights and remedies
provided by this title shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity
78. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
100TH CONG. 2D SESS., SEC RESPONSES TO THE TREADWAY COMMISSION 147 (Comm. Print 1988). For a con-
gressional account of the history of SEC civil penalties, see S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 4-8 (1990), 1990 WL 263550.
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amendments enacted under the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988 (ITSFEA).80
In 1990, passage of the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock
Reform Act of 1990 (Remedies Act) empowered the Commission to seek civil pe-
nalties for other violations that did not involve insider trading.8' Unlike the ITSA
and ITSFEA, the Remedies Act utilized a tiered penalty structure and included a
requirement that the SEC make "a proper showing" to obtain jurisdiction in its
pursuit of civil penalties under the Exchange Act.82 The tiered structure of the Re-
medies Act, when adjusted for inflation, provides for monetary penalties that in-
crease based upon an accumulation of factors.83
The first tier requires a violation of the Exchange Act, and qualifies an individ-
ual defendant for a penalty up to $6,500 ($65,000 if a corporation or similar entity)
or pecuniary gain from the offense, whichever is greater. 84 The second tier applies
to a defendant who used fraud, deception, or manipulation, or recklessly ignored a
regulation. Such defendant becomes eligible for a penalty not to exceed the higher
value of $65,000 ($325,000 if a corporation or similar entity) or defendant's pecu-
niary gain from the offense. 85 A jury's verdict for certain violations of the Ex-
change Act can determine a defendant's general eligibility for a first or second tier
penalty. 86
Third-tier penalties apply if the defendant's misconduct further risked or
caused a direct or indirect loss to investors, and such loss was substantial.87 The
defendant then qualifies for a penalty not to exceed $130,000 ($650,000 when a
80. See Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). For
example, amendments included provisions for levying hefty sanctions on "controlling persons." See 15 U.S.C. §
78u-l(a)(3) (penalizing "controlling persons" for higher value of $1 million, pecuniary gains, or losses avoided);
17 C.F.R. § 201.1003 (2005) (increasing base penalty to $1.275 million). Also, § 3(a)(2) of the ITSFEA reas-
signed the ITSA to Exchange Act § 21 A, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (2000).
81. See Pub. L. No. 101-429, §§ 201-202, 104 Stat. 931, 935-38 (1990) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78u(d)(3)(A) (authorizing the SEC to pursue penalties for violations of the Exchange Act in federal district
court), 78u-2 (authorizing the SEC to pursue penalties for violations of the Exchange Act in federal district court)
(2000)).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(a)-(b); ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS § 20:119 & nn.39-51 (2009) (noting the differences between the ITSA and Remedies Act, and
evaluating the ambiguous nature of "the court shall have jurisdiction to impose, upon a proper showing, a civil
penalty"), available at WL, SECDRSL § 20:119. The SEC can seemingly navigate around this ambiguity by
alleging that a defendant's actions both caused and risked investor losses. See, e.g., Complaint at 21, SEC v. Faria,
No. 06 CA 10657 RCL (D. Mass. Apr. 13, 2006), 2006 WL 1353694; Complaint at 23-24, SEC v. Selden, No.
1:05-cv-11805-NMG (D. Mass. Sept. 1, 2005), 2005 WL 2862259; Complaint at 7-9, SEC v. Converge Global,
Inc., No. 04-80841 Civ-Middlebrooks (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2004), 2004 WL 2663218.
83. Regardless of which tier a defendant's violation qualifies, a penalty may alternatively be assessed for
pecuniary gains attributable to the alleged act. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B).
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i); 17 C.F.R. § 201.1003 (2005).
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(ii); 17 C.F.R. § 201.1003.
86. Compare Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i)-(ii). A general
verdict form may also provide authority for the court to impose a penalty for multiple violations. See SEC v.
Solow, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1366-68 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (construing Miles v. Indiana, 387 F.3d 591,598 (7th Cir.
2004)). Concurrently, repeated violations of the same statutory provision can warrant multiple penalties. See SEC
v. Church Extension of the Church of God, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (asserting right to
impose penalties for multiple instances of a violation (citing SEC v. Henke, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086 (N.D. Cal.
2003), aff'd 130 Fed App'x 173 (9th Cir. 2005))).
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii); 17 C.F.R. § 201.1003.
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corporation or similar entity) or pecuniary gain from the offense, whichever is
greater.88  In the event a defendant enjoyed pecuniary gains exceeding the pre-
scribed maximum, any tier penalty may be increased to that gross value. 89
The Exchange Act amendments facilitated the Commission's ability to pursue
two goals: punishment and deterrence. 9° At the time of enactment, Congress indi-
cated a desire that the Remedies Act would provide the Commission with the ne-
cessary tools to seek monetary penalties in a flexible and prophylactic manner.91
Aside from the adjustments for inflation and a mechanism to distribute collected
funds to investors, the three-tier scheme to this legal remedy has remained undis-
turbed by Congress for nearly two decades.92
II. APPLYING DuRA AND RUTKOSKE PRINCIPLES IN SEC LITIGATION
A. Practical Considerations Under a Trifecta Enforcement Regime
1. The Impact of Extrinsic Factors Following Fraud-on-the-Market
In a case of fraud-on-the-market, the market price will generally absorb all
publicly available information and provide a means of causally connecting a de-
fendant's violation with harm to investors. 93 But even a security purchased in a
regulated picture-perfect "efficient market" can be affected by other extrinsic fac-
tors.94 The Supreme Court observed in Dura that where a longer period occurs
between transactions, "the more likely that other factors caused the loss." 95 The
88. Id.
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i)-(iii).
90. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Worldcom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2006)
(explaining .'the dual goals of punishment of the individual violator and deterrence of future violations"' (quoting
SEC v. Coates, 137 F. Supp. 2d 413,428 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
91. See H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 18 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1385 ("The Com-
mittee contemplates that the Commission would not seek to impose a civil money penalty in every case.").
92. Adjustments for inflation are included in the aforementioned figures are based upon 17 C.F.R. §
201.1003. In addition, the "Fair Funds for Investors" provision authorized distribution of collected civil penalties
to investors. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745, 784-85 (codified as 15
U.S.C. § 7246(a)); see also Unsecured Creditors of Worldcom, Inc., 467 F.3d at 81-82. The underlying nature of
this provision, and its connection to the equitable remedy of disgorgement are beyond the scope of this article. See
generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO REP. No. 05-670, SEC AND CFTC PENALTIES: CONTINUED
PROGRESS MADE IN COLLECTION EFFORTS, BUT GREATER SEC MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IS NEEDED 11 (2005)
(noting that the SEC has sought $1 disgorgement orders in some cases to ensure that civil penalties remain eligible
for distribution to investors).
93. See William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?,
54 EMORY L.J. 843, 847 (2005).
94. See, e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005); United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540,
548 (5th Cir. 2005); Samuel W. Buell, Overlapping Jurisdictions, Overlapping Crimes: Reforming Punishment of
Financial Reporting Fraud, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 1611, 1640 (2007) (recommending that courts consider whether
events unrelated to a defendant's fraud altered the price of stock when weighing criminal sanctions).
95. Dura, 544 U.S. at 343; see also United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Olis,
429 F.3d at 547) ("Many factors causing a decline in a company's performance may become publicly known
around the time of the fraud and be one cause in the difference in price ...."), cert. denied, Ebbers v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 1483 (2007); cf cases cited supra note 71 (comparing standards in the circuit courts for estimat-
ing a defendant's pecuniary gains from insider trading).
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Court's practical96 view aligns with modern economic theory applying the efficient
market theory to price change calculations for public-company shares.97  Excep-
tions exist: bubbles and crunches, such as the recent global credit crisis in 2008,
deviate from the efficient market that the Dura Court faced.98
2. Justification for Expansion of Dura and Rutkoske to SEC Enforcement
Actions
Although the government avers that loss causation has no application in civil
enforcement actions, 99 no authority has justified exempting the SEC from showing
a causal connection (or, alternatively, a "significant risk" of a causal connection) to
secure third-tier penalties. 100 Ironically, the SEC has cited to Dura in court filings
to analogize the causal connection between a defendant's actions, inflated purchase
prices, and alleged harm to investors. 01 But these citations were in no way indica-
tive of a belief by the SEC that Dura has any application in civil enforcement ac-
tions.
When measuring loss, courts generally employ a methodology that ensures a
causal link by excluding market effects occurring before and extrinsic from a cor-
96. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 344 (exclaiming "it is not surprising that other courts of appeals have rejected the
Ninth Circuit's 'inflated purchase price' approach to proving causation and loss"); id. at 342 (referring to metho-
dology "as a matter of pure logic"); see also Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 478 (4th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Dura), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1304 (2007); White, supra note 44, at 19 (proclaiming Dura "explained the
obvious"). In short, Dura appears to advocate practical application of economic theory-regardless of storied
"roots in the common law." See Dura, 544 U.S. at 345; supra note 38 and accompanying text.
97. Twenty-five years ago, there were questions whether financial disclosures required by the Commission
affected market efficiency. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(citing George Benston, An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of Government-Required Disclosure: SEC and
FTC Requirements, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 30, 53 (1977)). Since that time, embrace of the efficient market
view has become the norm. E.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244, 247 n.24, 248, n.27 (1988); BURTON
G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL
INVESTING 242-74 (W. W. Norton& Company, Inc. 2003) (1973). But see Ribstein, supra note 21, at 154-165
(arguing the limitations of Dura and fraud-on-the-market theory in behavioral-based irrational markets); William
0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 908-
930 (2005) (arguing that behavioral theory explains markets during stock bubble periods). For example, the
Commission now acknowledges that when it promulgates disclosure rules, those rules "'would be a cost to the
overall market efficiency and capital formation."' See SEC v. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694, 701
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange
Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,718 (proposed
Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 243, 249)).
98. See, e.g., Credit and Blame, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 2008, available at
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfn?storyid= 12209655.
99. See, e.g., SEC's Response to Court's March 23, 2006 Order Requesting Additional Briefing from SEC,
to the SEC's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Jordan's Estate at 8 n.7, SEC v. Pietrzak, No. 03C-1507
(N.D. I11. Apr. 4, 2006), 2006 WL 1679740; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
1, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932), 2004 WL 2069564.
100. But cf Rockies Fund, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 54,892, Investment Company Act Release No.
25,829, 2006 WL 3542989, at *12, n.43 (Dec. 7, 2006) (exercising discretion to issue a second-tier penalty, but
stating that a broker-defendant's violation "by its nature created a significant risk of substantial loss to investors"
warranting third-tier penalties as originally "contemplated by Congress").
101. See briefs cited supra note 21.
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rective disclosure. 0 2 Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc. explained the underlying ratio-
nale for this Dura principle:
Assume an investor purchased 100 shares... for $12 per share on
January 12, 2000, [mere hours] after the alleged misrepresentations
were made. If the market had known the truth [prior to a corrective
disclosure], instead of trading for $12 per share, the stock would
have traded for only $1 per share.
[C]ontending that, on the very day of purchase, the investor has
suffered a loss of $1,100-the difference between the price paid
($1,200) and the price that would have been paid ($100) had the
true facts been known.... [I]gnores the fact that the true facts are
not yet known and the hypothetical investor has not yet suffered a
loss.
If the stock later drops, as a result of normal market fluctuations, to
$6 per share (again assuming the fraud has not yet been disclosed),
then the investor owns stock worth only one-half of what was paid
for it. If he sells at this point, he has lost $600 of his initial $1,200
investment, to be sure, but this loss was not caused by the fraudu-
lent conduct, because, under the hypothetical, the market is still
unaware of the misrepresentations.
0 3
That rationale can likewise apply to the aggregate of investors whom the SEC
alleges suffered losses, just as it does to a class of investors filing suit on their own
behalf, or investors alleged to have suffered loss for purposes of determining an
appropriate criminal sanction.' °4 Often, these values can be presented by expert
witnesses through event study methodologies.1 °5 Coupled with an event study
102. See Glaser, 464 F.3d at 479 (advocating the exclusion of market effects before disclosure of fraud to
determine losses suffered by investors). Ebbers, 458 F.3d at 128 (identifying expert witness arguments that extrin-
sic market factors affected loss measured in criminal sentencing). Cf SEC v. Maxxon, Inc., 465 F.3d 1174, 1179
(10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2116 (2007) (advocating a disgorgement measurement that includes a
reasonable "end-date determination ... so that the defendant is not required to disgorge profits not 'causally con-
nected to the violation"').
103. Glaser, 464 F.3d at 478-79 (providing the "simple hypothetical" to explain Dura) (footnote omitted).
104. Cf Dura,544 U.S. at 343 (highlighting concern that defendants would otherwise face liability for
"changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts,
conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of that lower [or higher]
price"); Olis, 429 F.3d at 547 (identifying necessity to consider "numerous extrinsic market influences as well as
the soundness of other business decisions by the company"). But see Merritt B. Fox, Understanding Dura, 60
Bus. LAW. 1547, 1567 (2005) ("[The Court's] reasons, when subject to scrutiny, appear to be rather confused and
so they unfortunately do not provide much helpful guidance concerning how future courts should decide the open
issues delineated above."); Kauffman, supra note 17.
105. The author emphasizes that this hypothetical does not take into account the various factors such as
purchase date, sale, and other variables necessary to determine the losses suffered by shareholders. These calcula-
tions are best reserved for economic experts, who may use techniques such as an event study or valuation analysis.
See United States v. Olis, No. H-03-217-01, 2006 WL 2716048, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006) (accepting the
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analysis, a court could determine whether a defendant's violation caused or severe-
ly risked a "substantial loss" to investors.
1°6
B. Showing "Substantial Loss" Caused by a Defendant
The Supreme Court in Dura indicated that flimsy and ambiguous °7 measure-
ments for causation are inadequate if the statute requires proof of loss. 0 8 Paral-
leling this statement in Dura, courts should require "proof of significant losses or a
risk thereof' before analyzing the imposition of a third-tier penalty.' 09
There are differences in the language Congress used in the PSLRA and Reme-
dies Act."0 The PSLRA requires that a private plaintiff prove that a defendant
"caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.""' To secure a
third-tier penalty under the Remedies Act, the Commission must "show" that "such
violation directly or indirectly resulted in substantial losses or created a significant
risk of substantial losses to other persons."'" 2  Thus, alternative grounds exist to
permit securing a 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B) third-tier penalty.
1005, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aft'd, Mortensen v. Snavely, 145 F. App'x 218 (9th Cir. 2005)) (citation history
added); Madge S. Thorsen et al., Rediscovering the Economics of Loss Causation, 6 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 93, 95
(2006) (explaining that event studies can be further supported by valuation analysis). For a futher discussion of
event studies, see for example Ribstein, supra note 21, and Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, The Role of
Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Cases: Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49
BUS. LAW. 545 (1994).
106. A cursory search of LEXIS and Westlaw yielded values exceeding $4 million where a defendant's
violation caused or seriously risked "substantial losses" to qualify for a third-tier penalty. E.g., SEC v. Marker,
427 F. Supp. 2d 583, 593 (M.D.N.C. 2006) ($4.6 million); SEC v. Church Extension of the Church of God, Inc.,
429 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1049 (S.D. Ind. 2005) ($30 million); SEC v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d418, 426 (D. Md.
2005) ($4 million); SEC v. Lybrand, 281 F. Supp. 2d 726, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("millions of dollars in losses" for
purchasers of unregistered securities), affd, SEC v. Kern, 425 F.3d 143 (2d Cit. 2005); SEC v. Henke, 275 F.
Supp. 2d 1075, 1084-85 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ($2.6 million in claimed losses not disputed to warrant third tier penal-
ty), affd, 130 F. App'x 173 (9th Cir. 2005); SEC v. Global Express Capital Real Estate Inv. Fund I, LLC, No.
2:03-cv-01514-KJD-LRL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96477, at *70 (D. Nev. Mar. 28, 2006) ($50 million in losses
claimed by investors). But see SEC v. Opulentica, LLC, 479 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (slightly
under $444,000 in losses to investors from sale of unregistered securities); JACOBS, supra note 82 (arguing, with-
out example or citation, that "$100,000 clearly is ample and a lesser amount in the proper context easily could be
'substantial."') The SEC has not promulgated any rule to provide guidance on the definition of "substantial loss,"
whether such loss is risked or actual. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 340.2(h) (2007) (providing a definition of "sub-
stantial loss" for determining eligibility to purchase assets from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.).
107. The Ninth Circuit noted that the "touches upon" standard for determining causation prior to the Su-
preme Court's intervention was "admittedly ambiguous." Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th
Cir. 2003), rev "d, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). The standard had required only that an investor suffer injury following the
purchase of stock, "not... that a [company's] disclosure and subsequent drop in the market price of the stock have
actually occurred." Id.
108. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) ("To 'touch upon' a loss is not to cause a
loss, and it is the latter that the law requires."); Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Dura, 544 U.S. at 343) (extending Dura to the common law of Virginia), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1876
(2007).
109. See SEC v. Stringer, No. CV-02-1341-ST, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25523, at *18 n.2 (D. Or. Apr. 24,
2003), enforced, No. CV-02-1341-ST (D. Or. Sept. 3, 2003).
110. See infra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
111. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000)).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii) (2000); accord id. § 77t(d)(2)(C)(II) (corresponds to Securities Act of
1933, Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)); id. § 80a-
41(e)(2)(C)(II) (corresponds to Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as
14
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This does not displace the importance of loss. A comparison can be drawn
with the Sentencing Guidelines which allow a court to alternatively assess "in-
tended gain."' 1 3 The D.C. Circuit recently overturned the SEC's attempts to apply
third-tier penalties without providing an adequate explanation as to what loss or
risk of substantial loss was required in an administrative adjudication. 114 And lan-
guage included in the Remedies Act for Exchange Act violations (as well as viola-
tions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940) have led federal district courts to
reject an assertion of substantial losses, or similar risk, where "no losses were
demonstrated."" 5
Therefore, litigants should emphasize that the words "significant risk of sub-
stantial loss" do not act as a catchall phrase to permit third-tier penalties for misre-
presentation1 6 in addition to other defenses which may be raised against Commis-
sion arguments that a tier three penalty is warranted. 1 17 If the Commission claims
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52)); id. § 80b-9(e)(2)(C)(II) (corresponds to Investment Advisers Act of
1940, Pub. L. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21)).
Congress also imposed a similar requirement for proving substantial loss or risk thereof in administrative proceed-
ings, with recovery capped at the prescribed maximum in case of a defendant enjoying "substantial pecuniary
gain." See id. § 78u-2(b)(3)(B) (requiring in administrative proceedings that, inter alia, "such act or omission
directly or indirectly resulted in substantial losses or created a significant risk of substantial losses to other persons
or resulted in substantial pecuniary gain to the person who committed the act or omission"); accord id. §
80a-9(d)(2)(C)(ii) (corresponds to Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)) (same); id. § 80b-3(i)(2)(C)(ii) (corresponds to Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, Pub. L. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.))
113. Cf United States v. Snyder, 291 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002) ("When calculating the monetary
value of the victims' loss under Sentencing Guideline § 2F1.1(b)(1), substitution of defendants' gain is not the
preferred method because it ordinarily underestimates the loss." (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2F1.1 cmt. n.9, and United States v. Orton, 73 F.3d 331, 334 (1 lth Cir. 1996))).
114. See Rockies Fund, Inc. v. SEC, 428 F.3d 1088, 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting on grounds that
SEC's lack of explanation constituted an arbitrary and capricious application of sanctions under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) (citing Jost v. Surface Transp. Bd., 194 F.3d 79, 85 (D.C.
Cir. 1999))). The SEC brought the action pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which provides for
statutory penalties under language which resembles-with some differences-third-tier penalties under the Reme-
dies Act. Rockies Fund, Inc., 428 F.3d at 1098. See also statutes cited supra note 112.
Under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), an agency decision may be overturned if "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law." The Supreme Court has previously explained that on
review, a court must consider "whether the [agency's adjudicatory] decision was based on consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (citations omitted); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) ("The
grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its
action was based.").
115. SEC v. Slocum, Gordon & Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 144, 186 (D.R.I. 2004); accord SEC v. Inorganic
Recycling Corp., No. 99 Civ. 10159 (GEL), 2002 WL 1968341, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002).
116. See SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int'l Corp., No. 04 CV 2105 JM (MB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30919,
at *40 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2007) (rejecting "conclusory argument[s]" that defendants' press releases, which vi-
olated Rule 1Ob-5, created a significant risk of substantial loss to investors) , aff'd in part, vacated in part on
reconsideration, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (S.D. Cal. 2008).; SEC v. Abacus Int'l Holding Corp., No. C 99-02191
TEH, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12635, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2001) (imposing third-tier penalty of $110,000
where "actions were clear departures" from regulation and "created a significant risk of substantial loss to inves-
tors who purchased fraudulent securities through [defendant's] website"); SEC v. Todt, No. 98 Civ. 3980 (JGK),
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2087, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000) (refusing to impose third-tier penalty where neither
actual loss nor significant risk of substantial loss occurred when defrauded investors "[n]ever seriously entertained
transferring funds" to purchase fraudulent securities), aft'd, 7 F. App'x 98 (2d Cir. 2001).
117. In evaluating the facts and circumstances of the case, courts weigh factors including:
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substantial loss to investors, a blanket accusation of risk will prove inadequate." 8
But the burden should not be too high for the SEC to meet. In certain instances, a
reasonable estimate would suffice to evince loss. "9
Would requiring the SEC to provide evidence of loss be unprecedented? Three
circuits already require that the Commission show investor losses for purposes of
establishing subject matter jurisdiction in extraterritorial claims. 120 One prong of
that test obligates the SEC to prove a defendant's acts were committed domestical-
ly and "'directly caused' the claimed losses.' 121 Requiring the SEC to provide sub-
stantial evidence that a defendant created alleged losses to secure a third-tier penal-
ty presents a similar condition. 122
(1) the egregiousness of the violations at issue, (2) [the degree of] defendants' scienter, (3)
the repeated nature of the violations, (4) defendants' failure to admit to their wrongdoing;
(5) whether defendants' conduct created substantial losses or the risk of substantial losses to
other persons; (6) defendants' lack of cooperation and honesty with authorities, if any; and
(7) whether the penalty that would otherwise be appropriate should be reduced due to de-
fendants' demonstrated current and future financial condition.
SEC v. Lybrand, 281 F. Supp. 2d 726, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citations omitted), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Kern, 425
F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2005); cf SEC v. Sargent, 329 F.3d 34, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2003) (listing factors considered for
insider trading penalties) (citations omitted).
118. See cases cited supra note 116; cf cases cited supra notes 10 & 114.
119. Cf United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179-80 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2488
(2008) (noting that "reasonable estimate" of loss provided for under the Sentencing Guidelines might apply
"where share price drops so quickly and so extensively immediately upon disclosure of a fraud that difference
between pre- and post-disclosure share prices is a reasonable estimate of loss caused by the fraud"). Also, com-
pare United States v. Rigas, No. 02 Cr. 1236, 2008 WL 2544654, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2008), where the
court construed Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179-80, when it agreed with the government's "reasonable estimate" that
the defendant had caused $100 million in losses for purposes of an enhanced sanction under the Sentencing Guide-
lines. In Rigas, the price of stock decreased twenty-five percent on the day company revealed $2 billion in undis-
closed debt, and the court referred to defendant's argument, which was supported by expert testimony, as "bor-
der[ing] on the frivolous."
120. SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 193-94 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiing the SEC show a causal connection to
alleged investor losses to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the "conduct test"); accord Robinson v.
TCIIUS W. Commc'ns, Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1997); Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27,
29-30 (D.C. Ci. 1987). But see, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (requiring lesser showing
of material and substantial conduct for purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction).
121. See Berger, 322 F.3d at 193 (citations and internal quotations omitted). To meet the "conduct test," the
defendant's causal act must be "substantial acts in furtherance of the fraud [which] were committed within the
United States" under the first prong of the test, and also be "more than 'merely preparatory' to a securities fraud
conducted" outside the United States under the second prong of the test. See id. (quoting Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group
PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir.1995)). By comparison, the Remedies Act provides jurisdiction for federal
courts to levy civil penalties where the SEC makes "a proper showing." 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A); see also
JACOBS, supra note 82 (observing no such requirement for insider trading sanctions).
122. In order to secure a disgorgement order against a defendant the SEC carries an initial burden to show
the amount of the defendant's ill-gotten gains. See Roach, supra note 3, at 98. This burden is one of persuasion.
LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 1056 (5th ed. 2004) (citing SEC v.
Thomas James Assoc., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 95 (W.D.N.Y. 1990)) (asserting that the SEC carries the burden of
persuasion to prove it recommended calculation for the equitable remedy of disgorgement). Thereafter, in equity,
a defendant carries the burden of proof to rebut the SEC's claim for unjust enrichment. Roach, supra note 3, at 98.
But as Professor Roach observes, the rationale for this burden-shifting scheme does not "operate in reverse, as the
defendant has no access to information regarding the plaintiff's losses." Roach, supra note 3, at 97. Therefore, it
may be argued that the burden of proof falls on the Commission to show that a defendant's violations caused loss,
or risk thereof; in a manner that warrants a tier-three penalty. Cf, e.g., United States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715, 718
(9th Cir. 2007) (asserting that federal prosecutors carry the burden of proof when seeking a sentencing increase for
loss caused by a defendant under the Sentencing Guidelines) (citing United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073,
1086 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane)); United States v. Dolan, 701 F. Supp. 138, 139 (E.D.Tenn. 1988) (implying that
16
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C. Risks Abound: Why Alternative Grounds Do Not Absolve the SEC of
Statutory Burdens
The SEC frequently alleges that a defendant's violation significantly risked se-
rious harm to investors. 123 Likewise, federal prosecutors often pursue alternative
theories of intended loss under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. 124 In Unit-
ed States v. Snyder, the Eleventh Circuit held that where loss could be calculated
for purposes of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, alternative grounds of measuring
gain should not be assessed. 125 Alternative grounds for assessing penalties should
not be treated differently between criminal sentencing and civil remedial phases. 
26
Notwithstanding Snyder, the Supreme Court noted in Dura that showing loss re-
quires more than merely citing the value of stock on a given day. 127 To show risk,
the government carries the burden of proof for any adjustment under the Sentencing Guidelines where the gov-
ernment has "as much access to this information as the defendant"), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Barrett, 890
F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1989).
123. See infra Part ll.C.2.
124. The aftermath of the Fifth Circuit's recent opinion in United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 545 (5th Cir.
2005) (construing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 (2001)), may provide guidance to foresee
future interpretations of "significant substantial loss" and "significant risk of substantial loss" in SEC enforcement
actions. In Otis, the court noted the analogous standard for criminal sanctions under Sentencing Guidelines sec-
tion 2B1l.1 that "courts must take a 'realistic approach to determine what losses the defendants truly caused or
intended to cause."' Id. at 546 (quoting United States v. W. Coast Aluminum Heat Treating Co., 265 F.3d 986,
991 (9th Cir. 2001)).
On remand in United States v. Otis, the Honorable Judge Sim Lake followed this methodology to (1)
evaluate event studies presented by a government expert and (2) eventually reject a "neat, but overly simplistic"
methodology for alleging loss. See United States v. Olis, 98 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6846, 6854-55 (S.D. Tex. 2006)
(explaining that prosecutors failed to prove with "a reasonable degree of certainty the actual loss to shareholders
caused by" material omissions in financial disclosures). Judge Lake found it nearly impossible to estimate losses
with reasonable certainty, whereas calculations used "unprovable assumptions that yield speculative results." Id. at
6854. Judge Lake's words were not hyperbole, and should not be taken to indicate frustration with the Fifth Cir-
cuit's judgment. Instead, the facts Otis were too unique to apply the circuit court's calculations. See id. at 6855.
See generally United States v. Rothwell, 387 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2004) (defining intended loss as "'pecuniary harm
that would have been impossible or unlikely"' (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 cmt.
n.2(A)(ii) (2002)). Because adequate evidence support allegations of intended loss, the court adopted the govern-
ment's proposed calculation. See Otis, 98 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) at 6855-56 (citing "uncontroverted testimony" to
adopt government's proposed calculation, resulting in penalty which avoided sentencing multiplier).
125. 291 F.3d 1291 (1 lth Cir. 2002).
126. Compare United States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715, 720-21 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the government's
proposed grounds for calculating a criminal defendant's intended loss), with Frank 0. Bowman III, The 2001
Federal Economic Sentencing Reforms: An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 84 (2001)
(describing "risk of substantial loss" under the Sentencing Guidelines as the "[u]nrealized losses risked by the
offense").
Unlike intended loss, "risk of substantial loss" exists as a departure factor under the Sentencing Guide-
lines, albeit without specifying if the risk must be "significant." See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.19(A)(iv) (2007) (recommending an increase from the sanction recommended by the
Sentencing Guidelines in the event that "substantial risk of harm" is proven). Prior to the change in the departure
scheme, some courts measured "loss" by including risk of loss with actual loss in cases of loan and investment
fraud. See id. at 83-84 & nn.381-82 (2005) (citing United States v. Najjor, 255 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2001) and
United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 117, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000)). Unfortunately, criminal cases have not evaluated
risk to a degree that might offer a further basis for comparison to enforcement actions brought by the SEC.
127. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) ("Given the tangle of factors affecting
price, the most logic alone permits us to say is that the higher purchase price will sometimes play a role in bringing
about a future loss.").
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the Commission should proffer evidence which supports a finding by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 1
28
1. Broker-Dealer Operations and a Presumption of Risk
It may be argued based upon legislative history accompanying the Remedies
Act that Congress perceived that fraud targeting the price of the stock (i.e., fraudu-
lent broker-dealer operations) would create "significant risk of substantial loss.'
129
The Tenth Circuit's subsequent observation that "broker-dealer[s] or investment
adviser[s] ... employing deceptive practices ... are virtually certain to lead to in-
vestor losses" supports that rationale. 130  Concurrently, federal courts have deter-
mined that a defendant's actions are likely to create the risk of substantial loss in
transactions related to the fraudulent sales or marketing of securities 131 and pump-
and-dump schemes. 1
32
2. Errors for Risk in Fraud-on-the-Market
Distinguishing fraud-on-the-market from a pump-and-dump may appear
nuanced. 133 But cases alleging fraud-on-the-market that include release of amelio-
rative information are more readily discernable from the "face-to-face" transactions
128. To do so, the SEC could present evidence which shows that odds are one-to-one that the defendant's
act would have caused a substantial loss. See JACOBS, supra note 82, at § 20:109 & n.67 (construing "significant
risk" under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii) to be a probability not exceeding fifty percent). For a discussion of
substantial loss, see supra note 106 and accompanying text.
129. S. REP. No. 101-337, at 9-10 (1990), 1990 WL 263550 (indicating broker-dealer or investment compa-
ny's violation may create "serious risk of loss"); H. REP. No. 101-616, at 17 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1384 (same); see also SEC v. Milan Capital Group, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 0108 (DLC), 2001 WL
921169, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2001) (finding third-tier penalties totaling $10 million warranted for defendants
whose "fraud[ulent broker-dealer operations] resulted in potential losses to investors of over $8 million"); Rockies
Fund, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 54,892, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,829, 2006 WL 3542989,
at *7 & n.43 (Dec. 7, 2006) (exercising discretion to issue a second-tier penalty, but stating that the broker-
defendant's violation "by its nature created a significant risk of substantial loss to investors" warranting third tier
penalties as originally "contemplated by Congress").
130. See Geman v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183, 1193 (10th Cir. 2003) (reviewing penalty issued by an administra-
tive law judge).
131. SEC v. Coates, 137 F. Supp. 2d 413, 428-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding fraudulent sale of securities
involving "misrepresentations and omissions concerning the durability and marketability of the [securities sold]
created a greater amount of risk to investors than they were aware" to impose third-tier penalty, but reducing to
$10,000 per violation in light of rescission with purchasers); SEC v. Poirier, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1049 (D. Ariz.
2001) (indicating price created risk of substantial loss in case where defendants formed company to issue unregis-
tered securities); SEC v. Friendly Power Co., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (entering third-tier
penalty for creating "substantial risk that investors would lose their investments" by failing to register securities);
SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46 & n.15 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating "significant risk of substantial
losses" satisfied by fraudulent sale of unregistered securities); SEC v. Sofipoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 868
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same), aff'd in unpublished table decision, 159 F.3d 1348 (2d Cir. 1998).
132. See SEC v. Mandaci, No. 00 Civ. 6635 (LTS) (FM), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19143, at *40 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2004); SEC v. Rosenfeld, No. 97 Civ. 1467 (WHIP) (RLE), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166, at *3, 13
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2001), enforced No. 97 Civ. 1467 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2001).
133. Fraud-on-the-market cases which involve corrective disclosure can be distinguished from "pump-and-
dump" cases, whereas the former involve providing corrective information and the latter often involve driving the
price of stock into the ground. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 131.
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that brokers and dealers engage in. 134 Nevertheless, some opinions point toward
blurring the distinctive nature of these violations and presuming loss (or risk of
loss) occurred by not requiring the SEC to evidence the amount of loss suffered by
investors. 135 For example, in SEC v. Daly, the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia declared that a defendant's dissemination of false financial informa-
tion to auditors warranted third-tier penalties based on similar findings by federal
district courts. 136 Daly did not require the SEC to evidence the amount of loss suf-
fered by investors and rejected the defendant's argument that quantifying the loss
was impossible to calculate.1 37 Nor did it provide an explanation of how the defen-
dant's specific conduct created risk of loss. 138 Nevertheless, the SEC should first
present sufficient evidence to support the imposition of third-tier penalties. 139 The
Commission would fare best by arguing that both a substantial loss and a risk of
substantial loss occurred to avoid a similar result experienced under the U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines in United States v. Snyder. 40
CONCLUSION
Despite no requirement for the SEC to plead losses suffered by investors for
purposes of liability, the Commission should be prepared to meet its statutory bur-
den to show that third-tier penalties are warranted in federal district court. Recent
case law, including Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo and opinions issued by
the circuit courts of appeal have culminated in United States v. Rutkoske. This
body of case law supports requiring proof that the defendant's violation of federal
securities laws caused 14 1 substantial losses alleged by the SEC. The plain language
of 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B) supports creating a burden for the SEC to properly
134. See generally Burch, supra note 5, at 363-65 (distinguishing the equitable remedies available to private
plaintiffs for fraud committed in face-to-face transactions versus open market transactions); Ribstein, supra note
21, at 147-48 (elaborating upon the rationale of fraud-on-the-market theory and the intervening effect of extrinsic
information).
135. See SEC v. Daly, 572 F. Supp. 2d 129, 133 (D.D.C. 2008) ("shareholder loss is more than sufficient to
establish substantial harm" (quoting parenthetically SEC v. Koenig, 532 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2007))).
136. Id. (citing SEC v. Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d 121, 141-43 (D.D.C. 2007), and SEC v. Kenton Capital,
Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 1998), and SEC v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421-22, 426 (D. Md.
2005)).
137. Id. at 133, n.4 (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 132 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i)).
139. 17 C.F.R. § 201.1003 (2005) (increasing penalties to $130,000 for natural persons and $650,000 for all
others); see, e.g., SEC v. Marker, 427 F. Supp. 2d 583, 593 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (imposing third-tier penalty of
$500,000 "[g]iven the egregiousness of the fraud committed" and noting "Defendants' actions were both fraudu-
lent and deceitful and resulted in losses to individual investors of over $ 4.6 million"); SEC v. Lawbaugh, 359 F.
Supp. 2d 418, 426 (D. Md. 2005) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 201.1002) (applying third-tier penalty of $120,000 when
investor losses totaled $4 million from defendant); SEC v. Lybrand, 281 F. Supp. 2d 726, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(imposing third-tier penalty on defendants in fraudulent action resulting in "millions of dollars in losses" for pur-
chasers of unregistered securities), affd sub nom. SEC v. Kern, 425 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2005); SEC v. Converge
Global, Inc., No. 04-80841-CIV, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17581, at *18 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2006) (awarding third-
tier penalty despite no investor losses based upon Commission's arguments that defendant's misrepresentation in a
press release created "significant risk of substantial losses").
140. See supra notes 123-139 and accompanying text.
141. Alternatively, the SEC could also allege that a defendant's act significantly risked substantial losses.
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show either loss or risk of loss that resulted from a defendant's offense. The SEC's
enforcement program has done much to protect investors against irreversible harm.
But in those instances in which the Commission alleges that a defendant's actions
caused investor losses, a court should first consider the causal link between the
defendant's actions and alleged investor losses.
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